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Assistant Professor of Contracting Management
School of Systems and Logistics
Air Force Institute of Technology
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
ABSTRACT
Negotiation of contract terms, conditions, and prices is an oft-used but 
little studied activity in the Department of Defense (DoD). Several 
recent research projects undertaken by graduate students and faculty at 
the Air Force Institute of Technology have focused on learning more about 
the negotiation process as practiced by Government (primarily Air Force) 
contract negotiators. This paper summarizes some of the more interesting 
findings of two of these research efforts in the area of strategies and 
tactics employed during negotiations.
INTRODUCTION
Historically, the preferred method for creating contracts has been that 
called formal advertising, or more recently, sealed bidding. It was (and 
is) a formalized and rigid process designed to guarantee fairness and 
equity to all participants. Discussions with bidders is not allowed, and 
competition among independent bidders establishes the lowest price as 
fair and reasonable to the government. Because of its many fine 
qualities, this method was the legally mandated method for Government 
contracting for most of the past two hundred years. Unfortunately, 
although preferred in law, it quickly became evident that it could not be 
"used in every situation, and an alternative method, referred to as 
negotiation, or more recently, competitive proposals, was developed as an 
exception to the formal advertising rule. The exception became the rule, 
however, as negotiation has annually resulted in approximately 90 percent 
of all contracts awarded and nearly 95 percent of all dollars awarded. 
[Sherman, 1985]
In 1984 Public Law 98-369, popularly referred to as the Competition in 
Contracting Act, was passed including, among many other important 
provisions, a revision in the previous thinking about these two methods. 
Negotiation was given equal stature as a contracting method; that is, it 
was no longer considered an exception to the rule preferring sealed 
bidding. While sealed bidding was still to be used when feasible and 
practicably, negotiation was now accepted as a legal and valuable method 
of contracting.
This change places increased attention and inportance upon the abilities 
of those who represent the DoD in ne gotiating contractual agreements
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industrial suppliers. It is during the negotiating sessions that 
billions of dollars of taxpayers 1 money are coinnitted to the purchase of 
weapon systems , equipment and supplies, and services. It would seem that 
the manner in which these negotiations were planned and conducted, and 
the strategies and tactics used by negotiators in this important process 
would be of interest to other negotiators, managers, policy makers, 
taxpayers, and many others. Unfortunately, the amount of attention given 
to this important process, either in research or in training, does not 
seem to have matched its increased significance.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Little real research has been accomplished concerning the activities, 
specifically the strategies and tactics employed, which make up the 
process of negotiation. Several popular, practical books have been 
written primarily for the business cornnunity, which approach the topic 
from a lessons learned, how-to-do-it or how-not-to-do-it perspective; but 
the reader of these must rely on the experience and judgment of the 
writer, not upon statistical data gathered and analyzed through an 
appropriate methodology.
Extensive surveys of the negotiation literature performed by graduate 
contracting students and faculty at the Air Force Institute of Technology 
at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, [See Novak and Whitley, 
1976; Bearden and Chipman, 1977; Catlin and Faenza, 1985; Peterson, 1986; 
Johnstone, 1986; Horton, 1987] have classified much of this popular 
writing into three categories: General Negotiations, Negotiator 
Characteristics, and Negotiating Tactics and Strategies. Of particular 
interest to this paper were those in the latter category. [See, for 
exannple, Schelling, 1960; Pace, 1970; Karrass, 1974; Marshall and Pratt, 
1974; Waldman and Rutledge, 1975; Fuller, 1981; Shea, 1983].
CURRENT AIR FORCE STUDIES
At the Air Force Institute of Technology, Air Force military and civilian 
contracting professionals may pursue a Master of Science Degree in 
Contracting Management, fully accredited by the North Central Association 
of Colleges and Schools. As a required part of that degree program, 
students must accomplish a research project and document the results in a 
formal, written thesis acceptable to the faculty. In recent years the 
author, as Director of the Contracting and Manufacturing Management 
Program, has oriented several thesis research efforts toward the area of 
negotiation effectiveness of negotiation, psychological profile of 
negotiators, strategies and tactics employed. Itoo recent efforts in the 
latter area are particularly noteworthy.
Air Force Systems Comnand Study
One recent thesis research project [Catlin and Faenza, 1985] guided by 
the author collected data regarding the strategies and tactics errployed 
by contract negotiators in the Air Force Systems Command, the 
organization responsible for research, development and production of new 
weapon systems for the United States Air Force and for joint programs
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assigned to it. Of particular interest weie the most frequently used 
tactics of Air Force negotiators and of their counterparts in industry 
and the strategies employed in various contractual situations.
Definitions and Terms. The following definitions were provided:
STRATEGY: An organized plan or approach to negotiations from an 
overall perspective which may be comprised of one or more tactics.
TACTIC: Any specific action, words, or gestures designed to achieve 
both an immediate objective (such as countering an action by the other 
negotiating party) and the ultimate objective of a strategy.
In addition, the following lists of 10 potential strategies and 33 
potential tactics were compiled from the literature reviews referred to 
above.
STRATEGIES
1. COMBINATION (THE "BIG POT"): Introducing many issues at one time, 
using "throw away" points to get major concessions.
2. COVERAGE ("BOTTOM LINE"): Negotiating on total cost/price basis 
versus item-by-item.
3. DEFINITE ACTION ("TESTING THE WATERS"): Taking a definite 
position forcing the opposition to either accept or reject your 
position.
4. LIMITS: Using authority, time, budget, or other limits to 
pressure concessions from the opposition.
5. PARTICIPATION/INVOLVEMENT: Designing the team composition to 
narrow or broaden the areas of negotiation.
6. PATIENCE ("BUYING TIME" OR "STALLING"): Using delay tactics to 
prolong consideration of an issue or to counter a time limit strategy.
7. SURPRISE: Any unexpected action to gain acceptance of a point or 
obtain concessions from the opposition.
8. REVERSAL ("THE LESSER OF EVILS"): Presenting increasingly more 
rigid demands forcing the opposition to accept a lesser (preceding or 
following) offer   your true objective.
9. STATISTICS ("FIGURES DON f T LIE"): Using learning curves, trend 
analyses, or historical records, as the primary support for your 
position.
10. STEP-BY-STEP: Presenting a series of acceptable minor points to 
obtain a major concession; often used to counter the "Bottom Line" 
strategy.
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TACTICS
A. Adjust the thermostat
B. Allow face savings exits
C. Appeal to patriotism
D. Ask for lots of data
E. Belabor "Fair & Reasonable"
F. "Bogey" - Budget limits
G. Call frequent caucuses
H. Change negotiators
I. "Cherry-pick" the best deals
J. Deadlock the negotiations
K. Deliberate errors left in offer
L. Deliberately expose notes or 
	working papers
M. Embarrass your opponent
N. Escalate to opponent's boss
0. Escalate to your boss
P. "Good guy - Bad guy" roles
Q. "High-Ball" offers
R. Impose "no-smoking rule"
S. "Low-Ball" offers
T. Make an offer they must 
	refuse.
U. Massage opponent's ego
V. "Must be on contract by
W. "My plane leaves at
X. Negotiate with limited 
authority.
Y. "Off-the-record" talks
Z. Personal attack
AA. Play hard to get
BB. Refer to the firm's past 
poor performance
CC. Refer to your generosity 
DD. Reverse auctioning
EE. "Split-the-difference" 
offers
FF. "Take it or leave it" 
GG. Threaten to walk out
Methodology. Questionnaires were developed which solicited demographic 
information on the respondent and which asked hirq/her
(1) to select and rank the five tactics he/she used most 
frequently;
(2) to select and rank the five tactics his/her negotiating 
opponents used most frequently;
(3) to rank the ten strategies according to his/her preference for 
use;
(4) to rank the ten strategies according to his/her frequency of 
use; and
(5) to indicate his/her preferred strategy in each of several
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negotiation situations (five different contract types, six 
levels of contract dollar amount , three types of contractual 
action, two program stages, and three degrees of competition).
These questionnaires were reviewed and validated and sent to 1,051 
contract negotiators, the entire known population in the four major 
product buying divisions of the Air Force Systems Command. Responses 
were tabulated and analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS). Rankings among various subgroups of respondents were 
analyzed using the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance and the Kendall Tau 
tests .
Findings. Although a relatively small proportion of questionnaires was 
returned, giving rise to concerns of a possible nonresponse bias, the 
demographic statistics of the 278 respondents were fairly representative 
of their known population parameters.
Table I shows the frequencies with which each of the 33 tactics was 
listed among the top five by the respondents, first for their own use 
(under "A.F.") and then for use by contractors 1 negotiators (under 
"KTR"). The frequencies then are used to create rankings among the 
tactics. While some of the tactics are ranked similarly for both 
negotiating parties [see tactics 9, 16, 25, 29, 30, 31], many are 
inversely related [see tactics 2, 4, 5, 17, 19, 23]. Several of these 
latter tactics seem to indicate that the respondent feels he is the "good 
guy" while the contractor is the "bad guy." Tactics 2, 17, 19, and 23 
especially portray this dichotomy. It must be remembered, however, that 
it is the Air Force negotiator here who is providing data on both his use 
of tactics and on the contractors 1 use; therefore, the contractors 1 views 
are not really represented. To assist in drawing conclusions, Table II 
displays the ten most frequently used tactics for each party. Here 
again, a "good guy versus bad guy" interpretation can be drawn from the 
rankings. The Kendal Tau test indicated the two rankings were 
independent, or not in agreement with each other.
Tables III and IV show the results from the respondents 1 ranking of the 
ten given strategies in terms of frequency of use and then preference for 
use, respectively. The "ARS" column shows the average rank score each 
strategy received,* with the lowest number indicating highest rank. Then 
the strategies are assigned a final rank in the last column according to 
their average rank scores. The Kendall Coefficient of Concordance test 
indicated that there was strong consensus among the respondents on both 
rankings, frequency and preference. Coverage/Bottom Line was clearly the 
most frequently used and most preferred strategy, while Surprise, 
Reversal, and Patience were the least frequently used and least 
preferred. Statistics and Participation were given similar scores and 
ranked second and third respectively in frequency of use and third and 
second respectively in preference. Table V displays the frequency and 
preference rankings together. The observed similarity was substantiated 
by the Kendall Tau test, indicating strong agreement between the two 
rankings. This is interpreted to mean that negotiators are able to use 
most frequently those strategies they most prefer to use.
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The respondents indicated their preferred strategy for various 
contractual situations presented to them. Frequencies were then 
tabulated from these preferences.
a. Table VI presents strategy preferences for five different types of 
contract (by compensation arrangement) . Bottom Line was the preferred 
strategy for FFP and FPI contracts and its use diminished in the cost 
reimbursement type contracts, as might be expected. Definite Action, 
Participation, and Step-by-Step increase in use under the cost 
reimbursement types, and Statistics and Other Strategies (write-ins that 
were predominately combinations of two or more of the others) remain 
stable. Note the large numbers of respondents who do not have experience 
with each of the contract types (including ten with no experience in FFP 
contracts). There were also many No Preference responses.
b. Table VII shows results of respondents 1 selection of strategies 
for negotiation at various dollar levels. Bottom line gradually gives 
way to Statistics and Participation as dollar amounts climb above $1 
million. This may indicate increased complexity and the increased depth 
and breadth of evaluation required. The more uniform distribution at the 
higher dollar amounts may indicate that dollar value alone does not 
dictate a specific strategy adherence at those levels.
c. Respondents indicated very different strategy preferences when 
faced with the different situations of new contracts, modifications, and 
termination, as shown in Table VIII. Bottom Line dominates when 
negotiating modifications, and also leads for new contracts, followed 
closely by Combination and Participation. In termination actions, 
Statistics plays a large role, as it does in modifications. Nearly all 
respondents have had experience with modifications and the data indicates 
that two-thirds have had experience with terminations.
d. Table IX displays responses regarding the preferred strategy for 
research and development and that for production. Bottom Line is first 
for R&D and second for production, but the significant change is the 
shift from Participation in R&D to Statistics in production. This may 
indicate a need for technical experts during negotiations in R&D to 
assure the contractor understands the requirement, while production 
negotiations may be more concerned with the better defined and measured 
concepts such as production rates, learning, efficiency, and 
supportability. Other than this difference, the influence of phase of 
program on strategy seems to be limited.
e. Table X shows the distribution of key strategies for three levels 
of competition. Bottom Line dominates in the presence of competition. 
Dropping to only two competitors from three or more brings slight 
increases in the number preferring Participation, Combination, and 
Statistics, and a slight decrease in those preferring Bottom Line. In 
sole source (no competition) , larger increases in these same three 
strategies can be seen.
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Air Force Logistics'Command Study
Another study [Peterson, 1986] parallel to the one above was carried out 
in 1986 to gain information on the negotiation strategy preferences and 
uses in the Air Force Logistics Command, responsible for supporting , 
maintaining, and modifying the operational weapon systems of the Air 
Force. This project had the same research questions (applied to the 
different command of interest) , and used the same questionnaire and 
analysis methodology of the Air Force Systems Command study above. 
Fifty-six of the 226 questionnaires mailed were returned and/or complete 
enough to be used in the analysis, a return rate of 24.7 percent.
Findings. Table XI shows the frequency and rankings of the 33 tactics 
resulting from the new responses. Rankings here indicate a few 
similarities between the Air Force negotiators and contractor negotiators 
but a great many differences, as in the first study [see Table I], 
Again, the Kendall Tau test indicated significant differences. Table XII 
indicates these differences among the five most frequently used tactics. 
Note that the Air Force top five and the contractor top five are quite 
similar between the AFLC (the present) study and the AFSC (the previous) 
study.
The next two tables provide the average rank scores and the resulting 
rankings for the ten strategies for this (AFLC) study and compares the 
rankings to the previous AFSC study for first, the frequency of use 
(Table XIII) and then, the preference for use (Table XIV). There is a 
moderately strong consensus among the AFLC respondents on both use and 
preference, although not as strong as in the previous study. Further, 
the AFLC and AFSC rankings were found to be correlated, per the Spearman 
Rank Correlation Coefficient. Again here [see Table XV], there was 
strong agreement between the rankings by use and the rankings by 
preference, indicating the two are quite similar in AFLC also.
The pattern of strategies selected for the various contractual situations 
was quite similar to the previous study also.
a. Table XVI shows the frequencies of strategy selection for the five 
types of contracts. For FFP, Bottom Line was again the most frequently 
selected with Statistics second. For FPI Statistics was the most 
frequent, but a large number indicated No Experience with this contract 
type. For cost reimbursement type contracts, Step-by-Step was the most 
frequently selected strategy, but the most frequent response was again No 
Experience.
b. Contract dollar value in this AFLC study gave rise to the same 
shift in strategies as did the AFSC study, but at lower dollar 
thresholds. Table XVII shows the results of the questions in this area. 
The shift to Statisics and Combination starts at $100,000 and then, as 
dollar level increases, there is another shift toward Participation and 
Statistics and away from Bottom Line.
c. Table XVIII shows the most frequently selected strategies when 
faced with a new contract, modification to a contract, and termination.
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Bottom Line and Participation were the most frequent choices for the 
new 
contract situation (the AFSC study had Combination second). Statistics 
was the dominate strategy selection for modifications (whereas Bottom 
Line was dominate in the AFSC study with Statistics second) . Both 
studied agreed that Statistics was the preferred strategy for 
termination, although here again a large number indicated No Experien
ce, 
d. Table XIX indicates that fifty percent of the respondents had had
 
no experience with R&D contract negotiations, not unexpected for 
negotiators in this support command. Of those who had experience, 
Step-by-Step was the preferred strategy, quite different from the AFS
C 
study in which Bottom Line, Participation, and Combination were all 
selected more frequently than Step-by-Step. For production negotiati
ons, 
Statistics was the most frequent selection in both studies.
e. The degree of corrpetition brought slightly different results in 
this study. Table XX indicates that Combination and Bottom Line were
 the 
most frequently preferred when under competition in this study, while
 
Bottom Line and Statistics were selected most in the AFSC study [see 
Table X]. In the sole source situation, this study's respondents opted 
for Statistics and Participation most frequently, while the AFSC stud
y 
indicated Bottom Line and Statistics.
CONCLUSIONS
The data from these two studies suggest that negotiators tend to use 
the 
same tactics in different coirroands and tend to ascribe the same tacti
cs 
use to their contractor counterpart. Furthermore, the negotiators se
em 
to indicate that they use "good guy" tactics, reflecting a positive a
nd 
cooperative approach, while several of those which they attribute to 
their counterparts in industry might be described as "bad guy" tactic
s, 
negative and contentious. While it would seem possible for negotiato
rs 
to cross easily from one comnand to the other, at least as far as use
 of 
strategies and tactics is concerned, other studies have reported that
 
there is relatively little crossflow between the two.
In the area of strategy use and preference, there was generally stro
ng 
statistical evidence of agreement between the two commands, although 
the 
most frequently used strategy was different (Statistics for this study 
and Bottom Line for the AFSC study) . Minor differences appear in the 
selection of strategies in various contractual situations; however, i
n 
general, there is much consensus between the two conmands.
While more follow-on research is needed to increase the database and 
confirm these preliminary findings, a picture of the Air Force negoti
ator 
is beginning to emerge. Additional research into the effectiveness o
f 
negotiations [for example, Horton, 1987] will help us to better 
understand how we negotiate and, possibly, how we should negotiate.
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TABLE I 
Frequency and Ranking of Tactics
Frequencies
Tactic Code and Name
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11,
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
Adjust the thermostat
Allow face-saving exits
Appeal to patriotism
Ask for lots of data
Belabor fair and reasonable
"Bogey" budget limits
Call frequent caucuses
Change negotiators
"Cherry-pick" the best deal
Deadlock the negotiations
Deliberate errors left in offers
Deliberately expose notes or papers
Embarrass your opponent
Escalate to opponent's boss
Escalate to your boss
"Good-guy/bad-guy" roles
"High-ball" offers
Impose "no smoking rule"
"Low-ball" offers
Make an offer they must refuse
Massage opponent's ego
"Must be on contract by ...I"
"My plane leaves at ... o'clock."
Negotiate with limited authority
"Off the record" discussions
Personal attack
Play hard to get
Refer to firm's past poor performance
Refer to your side's generosity
Reverse auctioning
"Split-the-dif ference" offers
"Take it or leave it" offers
Threaten to walk out
Other write-in tactics
A.F.
8
95
25
115
103
36
68
3
11
25
17
10
5
59
55
45
1
4
64
20
33
24
2
32
74
1
16
41
63
6
97
32
16
-
KTR
0
4
3
6
21
8
35
14
12
63
51
2
9
27
36
39
106
0
7
39
30
77
41
113
64
19
46
6
58
8
142
88
53
-
Rankings
A.F.
26
4
17
1
2
13
6
30
24
18
21
25
28
9
10
11
32
29
7
20
14
19
31
15
5
33
22
12
8
27
3
16
23
-
KTR
32.5
29.0
30.0
27.0
19.0
24.0
16.0
21.0
22.0
7.0
10.0
31.0
23.0
18.0
15.0
13.0
3.0
32.5
26.0
14.0
17.0
5.0
12.0
2.0
6.0
20.0
11.0
28.0
8.0
25.0
1.0
4.0
9.0
-
TABLE II 
Ten Most Frequently Used Tactics
Rank Air Force Tactics Contractor Tactics
1 Ask for lots of data
2 Belabor fair and reasonable
3 Split the difference
4 Allow face-saving exits
5 Off-the-record discussions
6 Call frequent caucuses
7 Low-ball offers
8 Refer to your side's generosity
9 Escalate to opponent's boss
10 Escalate to your boss
Split the difference 
Negotiate with limited authority 
High-ball offers 
Take-it-or-leave-it offers 
Must be on contract by ... 
Off-the-record discussions 
Deadlock the negotiations 
Refer to your side's generosity 
Threaten to walk out 
Deliberate errors in offers
TABLE III 
Average Rank Scores and ARS Ranking of Strategy Frequency
Strategy
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Combination
Coverage/Bottom Line
Definite Action
Limits
Participation
Patience
Surprise
Reversal
Statistics
Step-by-Step
ARS
5.04688
2.86458
5.89583
5.51563
4.68229
6.57813
7.39583
7.25521
4.48438
5.37500
ARS-Rank
4
1
7
6
3
8
10
9
2
5
TABLE IV 
Average Rank Scores and ARS Ranking of Strategy Preference
TABLE V
Strategy
1.
2.
3.
4.
5. 
6.
7. 
8.
9.
10.
Corabination
Bottom Line
Definite Action
Limits
Part icipat ion 
Patience
Surprise 
Reversal
Statistics
Step-by-Step
ARS
5.08854
3.42138
5.75000
6.04167
4.13542 
6.50521
7.43750 
7.31771
4.29167
5.21875
ARS-Rank
4
1
6
7
2 
8
10 
9
3
5
Strategy
1.
2.
3.
A.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Corabination
Bottom Line
Definite Action
Limits
Participation
Patience
Surprise
Reversal
Statistics
Step-by-Step
Rank by
4
1
7
6
3
8
10
9
2
5
Rank by 
Preference
4
1
6
7
2
8
10
9
3
5
ro 
ro TABLE VI 
Frequencies of Strategies Under Different Contract Types
Strategy
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Combinat ion
Bottom Line
Definite Action
Limits
Part ic ipat ion
Patience
Surprise
Reversal
Statistics
Step-by-Step
No Preference
No Experience
Other Strategies
FFP
30
104
5
3
9
3
0
3
35
9
32
10
35
FPI
31
44
5
4
14
1
0
6
41
11
38
50
33
CPFF
16
35
14
6
27
1
0
2
31
16
37
60
33
CPIF
14
16
16
7
19
2
1
4
29
9
41
97
33
CPAF
10*
15*
11
6
22*
2
0
2
22*
7
36
112*
33
TAftLE VII 
Strategy Frequencies B«*W en dollar Value
Dollars in Millions
Strategy
Combinat ion
Bottom Line
Partic ipation
Statistics
No Preference
No Experience
Other*
Up
20
71
10
34
47
9
45
to
( 7
(25
( 3
(12
(16
( 3
(16
$1
.2Z)
.57.)
.6*)
.2Z)
.9Z)
.2Z)
.22)
$1
26
33
28
43
45
18
52
- $10
( 9
(11
(10
(15
(16
( 6
(18
.4%)
.9Z)
.1Z)
.5Z)
.2Z)
.5Z)
.7Z)
$10 - $25
21
26
29
37
41
48
49
( 7
( 9
(10
(13
(14
(17
(17
.6Z)
.47.)
.4Z)
.3Z)
.7Z)
.37.)
.67.)
Over $25
20
19
35
34
40
54
51
( 7.2%)
( 6.8Z)
(12. 6Z)
(12. 2Z)
(14. 4Z)
(19.47.)
(18. 3Z)
Combinations of listed strategies and others.
*Strategies with significant changes in selection frequency.
TABLE VIII 
Strategy Rankings Based on Contractual Action
Strategy
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
9.
Combination
Bottom Line
Participation
Stat istics
Step-by-Step
No Preference
No Experience
Other Strategy*
New
41
48
35
27
15
34
18
43
Contract
(14.77.)
(17.3%)
(12. 6%)
( 9.7%)
( 5.3%)
(12.2%)
( 6.5%)
(15. 5Z)
Modification
21
80
12
46
10
30
5
43
( 7.6%)
(28.8%)
( 4.3%)
(16.5%)
( 3.6%)
(10.8%)
( 1.8%)
(15.5%)
Terrainat ion
10
21
5
35
8
32
89
42
( 3.6%)
( 7.6%)
( 1.8%)
(12.6%)
( 2.9%)
(11.5%)
(32.0%)
(15.1%)
TABLE IX 
Strategy Rankings Based on Type of Acquisition or Program
Strategy
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Combination
Bottom Line
Participation
Statistics
Step-by-Step
No Preference
No Experience
Other Strategy
R & D
26
45
38
19
13
30
35
45
( 9.4%)
(16.2%)
(13.7%)
( 6.8%)
( 4.7%)
(10.8%)
(12.6%)
(16.2%)
Production
26
41
16
64
8
34
32
44
( 9.4Z)
(14.7%)
( 5.8%)
(23.0%)
( 2.9%)
(12.2%)
(11.5%)
(15. 8Z)
TABLE X 
Strategy Rankings Based on Degree of Competition
Three or More
Strategy
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Combination
Bottom Line
Definite Action
Participat ion
Statistics
No Preference
No Experience
Other
Contractora
16
52
18
16
24
35
49
42
( 5.8%)
(18.7%)
( 6.5%)
( 5.8%)
( 8.6%)
(12.6%)
(17.6%)
(15.1%)
Two Contractors
17
48
19
21
26
32
44
44
( 6.1%)
(17.3%)
( 6.8%)
( 7.6%)
( 9.4%)
(11.5%)
(15.8%)
(15.8%)
Sole Source
28
42
15
30
36
34
5
55
(10.1%)
(15.1%)
( 5.4%)
(10.8%)
(12.9%)
(12.2%)
( 1.8%)
(19.8%)
*Corabinations of listed strategies and others.
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TABLE XI 
Frequency and Ranking of Tactics
Frequencies
_Lactic Code and Name
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
Adjust the thermostat
Allow face-saving exits
Appeal to patriotism
Ask for lots of data
Belabor fair and reasonable
"Bogey" budget limits
Call frequent caucuses
Change negotiators
"Cherry-pick" the best deal
Deadlock the negotiations
Deliberate errors left in offers
Deliberately expose papers
Embarass your opponent
Escalate to opponent's boss
Escalate to your boss
"Good-guy/bad-guy" roles
"High-ball" offers
Impose "no smoking rule"
Tow-ball" offers
Make an offer they must refuse
Massage opponent s ego
"Must be on contract by ... !"
"My plane leaves at ... o clock."
Negotiate with limited authority
"Off the record" discussions
Personal attack
Play hard to get
Refer to firm s poor performance
Refer to your side's generosity
Reverse ar-tioning
"Split-the-difference" offers
'Take it or leave it" offers
Threaten to walk out
AF
2
16
6
31
26
8
15
2
3
5
2
2
0
10
10
10
0
0
14
8
8
15
0
11
8
0
3
6
22
0
23
4
1
KTR
1
1
2
3
2
2
9
6
6
18
14
0
0
8
8
4
22
0
1
10
12
7
11
20
18
4
12
2
8
1
33
21
9
Rankings 
AF KTR
24.5
5.0
17.5
1.0
2.0
14.5
6.5
24.5
21.5
19.0
24.5
24.5
30.5
11.0
11.0
11.0
30.5
30.5
8.0
145
14.5
6.5
30.5
9.0
14.5
30.5
21.5
17.5
4.0
30.5
3.0
20.0
27.0
28.5
28.5
24.5
22.0
24.5
24.5
12.5
18.5
18.5
5.5
7.0
32.0
32.0
15.0
15.0
20.5
2.0
32.0
28.5
11.0
8.5
17.0
10.0
4.0
5.5
20.5
K.3
24.5
15.0
28.5
1.0
3.0
12.5
TABLE XII 
Most Frequently Used Tactics
Rank Air Force Tactics AFLC Contractor Tactics
1 . Ask for lots of data
2 Belabor fair and reasonable
3 "Split the difference" offers
4 Refer to your side's generosity
5 Allow face-saving exits
AFSC
"Split the difference" offers
"High-ball" offers
"Take it or leave it" offers
Negotiate with limited authority
Deadlock the negotiations
"Off the record" discussions (tie)
1
2
3
4
5
Ask for lots of data
Belabor fair and reasonable
"Split the difference " offers
Allow face-saving exits
"Off the record" discussions
"Split the difference" offers
Negotiate with limited authority
"High-ball" offers
'Take it or leave it" offers
"Must be on contract by ..."
Table XIII 
Average Rank Scores and ARS Ranking of Strategy Frequency
Strategy ARS AFLC-Rank AFSC-Rank
1.
2.
3.
4.
5-
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Combination
Coverage/Bottom Line
Definite Action
Limits
Participation
Patience
Surprise
Reversal
Statistics
Step-by-Step
4.94643
4.23214
5.48214
5-57143
5.33^29
6.28571
7.42857
7.14286
3.96429
4.71429
4
2
6
7
5
8
10
9
1
3
4
1
7
6
3
8
10
9
2
5
ro
COo
Table XIV 
Average Ranic Scores and ARS Ranking of Strategy Preference
Strategy
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Combination
Coverage/Bottom Line
Definite Action
Limits
Participation
Patience
Surprise
Reversal
Statistics
Step-by-Step
ARS
5-17857
4.732 14
5-19643
6.07143
4.53571
6.26786
7.39286
7.05357
3.80357
4.67857
AFLC-Rank
5
4
6
7
2
8
10
9
1
3
AFSC Rank
4
1
6
7
2
8
10
9
3
5
Table XVI 
Frequency of Strategies Under Different Contract Types
Strategy
1. Combination
2. Coverage/Bottom Line
3. Definite Action
4. Limits
5. Participation
 6. Patience
7. Surprise
8. Reversal
9. Statistics
10. Slep-by-Step
11. No Preference
12. No Experience
13. Other Strategies
FFP
6
20
3
2
5
0
0
0
13
6
0
0
1
FPI
5
5
2
1
4
0
0
0
10
6
2
25
1
CPFF
3
2
3
4
5
0
0
1
5
10
2
20
1
CPIF
1
0
3
0
3
0
0
2
3
6
3
34
1
CPAF
2
1
2
1
4
0
0
2
2
4
2
35
1
Table XV 
Rankings of Strategies Used to Strategies Preferred
Strategy
1. Combination
2. Cover age /Bottom Line
3. Definite Action
4. Limits
5. Participation
6. Patience
7. Surprise
8. Reversal
9. Statistics
10. Step-by-Step
Rank by 
Frequency
4
2
6
7
5
8
10
9
1
3
Rank by 
Preference
5
4
6
7
2
8
10
9
1
3
TABLE XVII 
Strategy Frequencies Based on Dollar Value
Strategy
Combination
Bottom Line
Participation
Statistics
Step-by-Step
No Preference
No Eiperience
Other
S25-100K
6-10.7%
20-35.7%
!- 1.8%
6-10.7%
3- 5.4%
2- 3.6%
3- 5.4%
5- 8.9%
I1001C-1M
10-17.9%
8-14.3%
4- 7.1%
9-16.1%
5- 8.9%
1- 1.8%
4- 7.1%
5- 8.9%
J1-10M
6-10.7%
5- 8.9%
8-14.3%
8-14.3%
3- 5.4%
1- 1.8%
9-16.1%
5- 8.9%
I10-25M
6-10.7%
1- 1.8%
7-12.5%
7-12.5%
5-10.7%
2- 36%
16-286%
6-10.7%
TABLE XVIII 
Strategy Rankings Based on Contractual Action
Strategy
1.
2.
5.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Combination
Bottom Line
Participation
Statistics
Step-by-Step
No Preference
No Experience
Other
New Contract Modification
8-14.3%
10-17.9%
10-17.9%
7-12.5%
8-14.3%
1- 1.8%
1- 1.8%
4- 7.1%
7-12.5%
4- 7.1%
3- 5.4%
23-41.1%
2- 3.6%
1- 1.8%
5- 8.9%
4- 7.1%
Termination
2- 3.6%
3- 5.4%
1- 1.8%
6-10.7%
6- 10.7%
1- 1.8%
20-35.7%
5- 8.9%
TABLE XIX 
Strategy Rankings Based on Type of Acquisition or Program
Strategy
1. Combination
2. Bottom Line
5. Participation
9. Statistics
10. Step-by-Step
11. No Preference
12. No Experience
13. Other
R&D
4- 7.1%
1- 1.8%
2- 3.6%
4- 7.1%
7-12.5%
1- 1.8%
28-30.0%
6-10.7%
Production
5- 8.9%
6-10.7%
5- 8.9%
16-25.0%
2- 3-6%
0- 0.0%
11-19.6%
7-12.5%
ro
CO
TABLE XX 
Strategy Rankings Based on Degree of Competition
Strategy
1.
2.
5.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Combination
Bottom Line
Participation
Statistics
Siep-by-Step
No Preference
No Experience
Other
Three or More 
Contractors
10-17.9%
9-16.1%
4- 7.1%
3- 5.4%
3- 5.4%
3- 5.4%
3- 5.4%
9-16.1%
Two 
Contractors
7-12.5%
7-12.5%
3- 5.4%
7-12.5%
3- 5.4%
3- 5.4%
3- 5-4%
10-17.9%
Sole Source
9-16.1%
4- 7.1%
10-17.9%
15-26.8%
5- 8.9%
0- 0.0%
0- 0.0%
5- 8.9%
